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Abstract
This paper presents a new soundness proof for concurrent separation logic (CSL) in terms of a standard
operational semantics. The proof gives a direct meaning to CSL judgments, which can easily be adapted to
accommodate extensions of CSL, such as permissions and storable locks, as well as more advanced program
logics, such as RGSep. Further, it explains clearly why resource invariants should be ‘precise’ in proofs
using the conjunction rule.
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1 Introduction
Concurrent separation logic [15] (CSL) is a concurrent program logic, a formal sys-
tem for proving certain correctness properties of concurrent programs. It is based
on the notion of resource ownership, where the resource typically is dynamically al-
located memory (i.e., the heap). Since its inception by O’Hearn, it has become quite
popular, because it permits elegant correctness proofs of some complex concurrent
pointer programs that keep track of their memory consumption and explicitly deal-
locate any unused memory. Its popularity is evident by the number of extensions
to CSL (e.g., permissions [2,1], locks in the heap [9,13], variables as resource [16],
re-entrant locks [11]).
Besides having many extensions, CSL also has many soundness proofs. Some
proofs [3,12,10] are about plain CSL, some [5,9,13,11] are about a particular exten-
sion, while others [6,4] are abstract.
Following Brookes’s original proof [3], several proofs [13,6,4] give the semantics
of triples in terms of a non-standard ‘intermediate’ semantics that keeps explicit
track of resource ownership during execution. In such semantics, acquiring and
releasing a lock, operations that normally update a single bit, instead allocate or
deallocate part of the heap (receiving it from or sending to a shared resource). The
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 276 (2011) 335–351
1571-0661 © 2011 Elsevier B.V. 
www.elsevier.com/locate/entcs
doi:10.1016/j.entcs.2011.09.029
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license. 
adequacy of the intermediate semantics is usually justiﬁed by an ‘erasure’ theorem
stating that the intermediate semantics simulates a standard semantics.
Some other proofs [11,14,9,10] instead are completely syntactic: they never de-
ﬁne the meaning of CSL judgments, but rather establish a global invariant that
ensures data-race freedom and that is preserved under execution steps. This proof
technique is similar to the “progress and preservation” strategy that is common in
soundness proofs of type systems and is rather fragile. If, for instance, a new con-
struct were to be added to the language, the soundness of the existing rules would
have to be reproved. Moreover, as the meaning of CSL judgments is never de-
ﬁned except perhaps for closed ‘top-level’ programs, it is never clear what program
speciﬁcations actually mean.
In this paper, we take a direct approach to proving soundness of CSL. We deﬁne
the meaning of CSL judgments directly in terms of a standard concrete operational
semantics for the programming language. Our deﬁnition is concise and results in
a relatively simple soundness proof, which we have formalised in Isabelle/HOL. 1
Our soundness statement has three important beneﬁts:
(i) It encompasses the framing aspect of separation logic. As a result, the proof
does not technically require that the operational semantics satisﬁes the “safety
monotonicity” and the “frame” properties [20].
(ii) It does not insist on resource invariants being precise. Similar to Gotsman
et al. [10], we prove (a) that CSL with possibly imprecise resource invariants
and without the conjunction rule is sound, and (b) that the conjunction rule is
sound provided that the resource invariants in scope are precise. Both proofs
use the same semantics for CSL judgments.
(iii) It can easily be adapted to cover CSL extensions, such as permissions [2,1],
RGSep [19], deny/guarantee, and concurrent abstract predicates [7].
Paper Outline. For pedagogic reasons, we will ﬁrst focus on a cut down version
of CSL where the only construct for synchronisation is an atomic block executing in
one atomic step (§2). We shall give the syntax and semantics of the programming
language and of separation logic assertions, as well as the CSL proof rules. We shall
then deﬁne carefully the semantics of the CSL judgments (§3) and prove that the
proof rules are sound (§4).
Later, in §5, we shall consider O’Hearn’s original setting with multiple named
conditional critical regions that execute non-atomically, but in mutual exclusion,
and prove CSL’s data race freedom result. Finally, we will adapt our correctness
statements to handle extensions of CSL, such as permissions (§6) and RGSep (§7).
1 The proof scripts are available at http://www.mpi-sws.org/~viktor/cslsound [18].
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(skip;C2), σ → C2, σ
(Seq1)
C1, σ → C′1, σ′
(C1;C2), σ → (C′1;C2), σ′
(Seq2)
C1, σ → abort
(C1;C2), σ → abort
(SeqA)
σ = (s, h) [[B]](s)
(if B then C1 else C2), σ → C1, σ
(If1)
σ = (s, h) ¬[[B]](s)
(if B then C1 else C2), σ → C2, σ
(If2)
C, σ →∗ abort
atomic C, σ → abort
(AtomA)
C, σ →∗ skip, σ′
(atomic C), σ → skip, σ′
(Atom)
C1, σ → C′1, σ′
(C1‖C2), σ → (C′1‖C2), σ′
(Par1)
C2, σ → C′2, σ′
(C1‖C2), σ → (C1‖C′2), σ′
(Par2)
(skip‖skip), σ → skip, σ
(Par3)
C1, σ → abort
(C1‖C2), σ → abort
(ParA1)
C2, σ → abort
(C1‖C2), σ → abort
(ParA2)
(while B do C), σ → (if B then (C;while B do C) else skip), σ
(Loop)
(Assign) x := E, (s, h) → skip, (s[x := [[E]](s)], h)
(Read) x := [E], (s, h) → skip, (s[x := v], h) if h([[E]](s)) = v
(ReadA) x := [E], (s, h) → abort if [[E]](s) /∈ dom(h)
(Wri) [E]:=E′, (s, h) → skip, (s, h[[[E]](s) := [[E′]](s)]) if [[E]](s) ∈ dom(h)
(WriA) [E]:=E′, (s, h) → abort if [[E]](s) /∈ dom(h)
(All) x := alloc(E), (s, h) → skip, (s[x := ], h[ := [[E]](s)]) where  /∈ dom(h)
(Free) dispose(E), (s, h) → skip, (s, h[[[E]](s) := ⊥]) if [[E]](s) ∈ dom(h)
(FreeA) dispose(E), (s, h) → abort if [[E]](s) /∈ dom(h)
Fig. 1. Small-step operational semantics for commands.
2 Concurrent Separation Logic
Consider the following simple language of commands:
E ::= x | n | E + E | E − E | . . .
B ::= B ∧B | ¬B | E = E | E ≤ E | . . .
C ::= skip | x := E | x := [E] | [E] := E | x := alloc(E) | dispose(E)
| C1;C2 | C1‖C2 | if B then C1 else C2 | while B do C | atomic C
Arithmetic expressions, E, consist of program variables, integer constants, and
arithmetic operations. Boolean expressions, B, consist of arithmetic equalities and
inequalities and Boolean operations. Commands, C, include the empty command,
variable assignments, memory reads, writes, allocations and deallocations, sequen-
tial composition, parallel composition, conditionals, loops, and atomic commands.
We assume a domain of variable names (VarName), a domain of memory loca-
tions (Loc) and a domain of values (Val) that includes memory locations and deﬁne
the following composite domains:
s ∈ Stack def= VarName → Val stacks (interpretations for variables)
h ∈ Heap def= Loc ⇀ﬁnVal heaps (dynamically allocated memory)
σ ∈ State def= Stack× Heap program states
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Arithmetic and Boolean expressions are interpreted denotationally as total func-
tions from stacks to values or Boolean values respectively:
[[ ]] : Exp → Stack → Val [[ ]] : BoolExp → Stack → {true, false}
[[x]](s)
def
= s(x) [[B1 ∧B2]](s) def= [[B1]](s) ∧ [[B2]](s)
[[E1 + E2]](s)
def
= [[E1]](s) + [[E2]](s) [[E1 ≤ E2]](s) def= [[E1]](s) ≤ [[E2]](s)
Commands are given a small-step operational semantics in Figure 1. Conﬁgu-
rations are pairs (C, σ) of a command and a state. There are transitions from one
conﬁguration to another as well as transitions from a conﬁguration to abort de-
noting execution errors such as accessing an unallocated memory location. Parallel
composition interleaves executions of its two components, while atomic commands
execute their body, C, in one transition. In the premise of Atom, →∗ stands for
zero or more → transitions. 2
Separation logic assertions include Boolean expressions, all the classical connec-
tives, ﬁrst order quantiﬁcation, and ﬁve assertions pertinent to separation logic.
These are the empty heap assertion (emp), the points-to assertion (E1 → E2) indi-
cating that the heap consists of a single memory cell with address E1 and contents
E2, separating conjunction (∗), separating implication (−∗), and an iterative version
of separating conjunction ():
P,Q,R, J ::= B | P ∨Q | P ∧Q | ¬P | P ⇒ Q | ∀x. P | ∃x. P
| emp | E1 → E2 | P ∗Q | P −∗Q |i∈I Pi
Assertions denote sets of states. Their semantics is given as a modelling relation,
s, h |= P , stating that the state (s, h) satisﬁes the assertion P .
s, h |= emp def⇐⇒ dom(h) = ∅
s, h |= E → E′ def⇐⇒ dom(h) = [[E]](s) ∧ h([[E]](s)) = [[E′]](s)
s, h |= P ∗Q def⇐⇒ ∃h1, h2. h = h1 unionmulti h2 ∧ (s, h1 |= P ) ∧ (s, h2 |= Q)
s, h |= P −∗Q def⇐⇒ ∀h1. def(h unionmulti h1) ∧ (s, h1 |= P ) =⇒ (s, h unionmulti h1 |= Q)
Here, h1 unionmulti h2 stands for the union of the two heaps h1 and h2 and is undeﬁned
unless dom(h1) ∩ dom(h2) = ∅. We write def(X) to say that X is deﬁned. The
other assertions are interpreted classically. Finally, we write E → − as a shorthand
for ∃v. E → v where v /∈ fv(E).
An important class of assertions are the so-called precise assertions, which are
assertions satisﬁed by at most one subheap of any given heap. Formally, if there
are satisﬁed by two such heaps, h1 and h
′
1, the two must be equal:
Deﬁnition 2.1 An assertion, P , is precise iﬀ for all h1, h2, h
′
1, and h
′
2, if def(h1unionmultih2)
and h1 unionmulti h2 = h′1 unionmulti h′2 and s, h1 |= P and s, h′1 |= P , then h1 = h′1.
2 Normally, in addition to Atom, there should be another rule for inﬁnite executions for the body of atomic
blocks. For simplicity, we omit such a rule. In §5, we will present a diﬀerent semantics that does not involve
→∗ and does not suﬀer from this problem.
V. Vafeiadis / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 276 (2011) 335–351338
J  {P} skip {P}
(Skip)
x /∈ fv(J)
J  {[E/x]P} x := E {P}
(Assign)
x /∈ fv(E,E′, J)
J  {E 	→ E′} x := [E] {E 	→ E′ ∧ x = E′}
(Read)
J  {E 	→ −} [E] := E′ {E 	→ E′}
(Write)
x /∈ fv(E, J)
J  {emp} x:=alloc(E) {x 	→ E}
(Alloc)
J  {E 	→ −} dispose(E) {emp}
(Free)
J  {P} C1 {Q} J  {Q} C2 {R}
J  {P} C1;C2 {R}
(Seq)
J  {P ∧B} C1 {Q}
J  {P ∧ ¬B} C2 {Q}
J  {P} if B then C1 else C2 {Q}
(If)
J  {P ∧B} C {P}
J  {P} while B do C {P ∧ ¬B}
(While)
emp  {P ∗ J} C {Q ∗ J}
J  {P} atomic C {Q}
(Atom)
J  {P1} C1 {Q1}
J  {P2} C2 {Q2}
fv(J, P1, C1, Q1) ∩ wr(C2) = ∅
fv(J, P2, C2, Q2) ∩ wr(C1) = ∅
J  {P1 ∗ P2} C1‖C2 {Q1 ∗Q2}
(Par)
J ∗R  {P} C {Q}
J  {P ∗R} C {Q ∗R}
(Share)
J  {P} C {Q}
fv(R) ∩ wr(C) = ∅
J  {P ∗R} C {Q ∗R}
(Frame)
J  {P} C {Q}
P ′ ⇒ P Q ⇒ Q′
J  {P ′} C {Q′}
(Conseq)
J  {P1} C {Q1}
J  {P2} C {Q2}
J  {P1 ∨ P2} C {Q1 ∨Q2}
(Disj)
J  {P} C {Q} x /∈ fv(C)
J  {∃x. P} C {∃x. Q}
(Ex)
J  {P1} C {Q1}
J  {P2} C {Q2} J precise
J  {P1 ∧ P2} C {Q1 ∧Q2}
(Conj)
Fig. 2. Concurrent separation logic proof rules.
CSL judgments are of the form, J  {P} C {Q}, where J is known as the
resource invariant, P as the precondition, and Q as the postcondition. Informally,
these speciﬁcations say that if C is executed from an initial state satisfying P ∗ J ,
then J will be satisﬁed throughout execution and the ﬁnal state (if the command
terminates) will satisfy Q ∗ J . There is also an ownership reading attached to the
speciﬁcations saying that the command ‘owns’ the state described by its precon-
dition: the command can change it and can assume that no other parallel thread
can change it. In contrast, the state described by J can be changed by other con-
currently executing threads. The only guarantee is that it will always satisfy the
resource invariant, J .
The proof rules are shown in Figure 2. Among the proof rules, some are partic-
ularly noteworthy. Read and Write both require that the memory cell accessed
is part of the precondition: this ensures that the cell is allocated (and hence, the
access will be safe) and that no other thread is accessing it concurrently. Atom
allows the body of atomic blocks to use the resource invariant, J , and requires them
to re-establish it at the postcondition. Par allows us to compose two threads in
parallel if and only if their preconditions describe disjoint parts of the heap. This
prevents data races on memory locations. The side-conditions ensure that there are
also no data races on program variables—here, fv returns the set of free variables
of a command or an assertion, whereas wr(C) returns the set of variables being as-
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signed to by the command C. 3 Share allows us at any time to extend the resource
invariant by separatingly conjoining part of the local state, R. Frame allows us
to ignore part of the local state, the frame R, which is not used by the command,
ensuring that R is still true at the postcondition.
Finally, the conjunction rule, Conj, has a perhaps surprising side-condition.
This side-condition is necessary for soundness as illustrated by Reynolds’s coun-
terexample [15, §11]. Most presentations require precise J ’s in all judgments. This,
however, is unnecessary: only Conj needs precision.
3 The Meaning of CSL Judgments
We deﬁne the semantics of CSL judgments in terms of an auxiliary predicate,
safen(C, s, h, J,Q), stating that the command C executing with a stack, s, and a
local heap, h, is safe with respect to the resource invariant J and the post-condition
Q for up to n execution steps. A CSL judgment, J |= {P} C {Q}, simply says that
the program C is safe with respect to J and Q for every initial local state satisfying
the precondition, P , and for any number of steps:
Deﬁnition 3.1(Conﬁguration Safety)
• safe0(C, s, h, J,Q) holds always.
• safen+1(C, s, h, J,Q) holds if and only if
(i) if C = skip, then s, h |= Q; and
(ii) for all hJ and hF, if s, hJ |= J and (h unionmulti hJ unionmulti hF) is deﬁned, then
C, (s, h unionmulti hJ unionmulti hF) → abort; and
(iii) for all C ′, hJ , hF, h′ and s′, if s, hJ |= J , and (h unionmulti hJ unionmulti hF) is deﬁned, and
C, (s, h unionmulti hJ unionmulti hF) → C ′, (s′, h′), then there exist h′′ and h′J such that h′ =
h′′ unionmulti h′J unionmulti hF and s′, h′J |= J and safen(C ′, s′, h′′, J,Q).
Deﬁnition 3.2 J |= {P} C {Q} if and only if for all n, s, and h, if s, h |= P , then
safen(C, s, h, J,Q).
Intuitively, any conﬁguration is safe for zero steps. For n+ 1 steps, it must (i)
satisfy the postcondition if it is a terminal conﬁguration, (ii) not abort, and (iii)
after any step, re-establish the resource invariant and be safe for another n steps.
The number of steps merely ensures the deﬁnition is structurally decreasing.
In more detail, h is the part of the heap that is ‘owned’ by the command:
the command can update h and no other command can access it in parallel. In
conditions (ii) and (iii), hJ represents the part of the heap that is shared among
threads, and must hence satisfy the resource invariant. So, condition (iii) ensures
that after the transition a new such component, h′J , can be found. Finally, hF
represents the remaining part of the heap owned by the rest of the system. In
condition (ii), the command must not abort regardless of what that remaining part
3 For simplicity, we impose draconian variable side-conditions. In eﬀect, only heap cells may be shared
among threads, as J cannot mention any updateable variables.
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is. In condition (iii), the command must not change any part of the heap that could
be owned by another thread. Therefore, hF must be a subheap of the new heap h
′.
Safety Monotonicity & Frame Property. The purpose of the hF quantiﬁcations
is to admit the frame rule. In condition (ii), hF essentially plays the role of “safety
monotonicity” [20], which requires that if (C, h) is safe (i.e., does not abort), then
(C, h unionmulti hF) is also safe.
Similarly, in condition (iii), hF plays the role of the “frame property” [20], which
requires that whenever (C, h) is safe and C, (s, hunionmultihF) → C ′, (s′, h′), then there exists
h′′ such that C, (s, h) → C ′, (s′, h′′) and h′ = h′′unionmultihF. Condition (iii) does not quite
imply the frame property, as it does not require that C, (s, h) → C ′, (s′, h′′). It
rather takes the transition C, (s, h) → C ′, (s′, h′′) into account even though it might
not be present.
The diﬀerence is quite subtle. In particular, if the operational semantics satisﬁes
the safety monotonicity and frame properties (which it does in our case), we can drop
the hF quantiﬁcation. (See [18] for a proof.) Having the quantiﬁcation, however,
is crucial for some of the CSL extensions (see §6) and even simpliﬁes some of the
proofs for the normal CSL (Par and Frame).
Discussion. A nice aspect of Deﬁnition 3.1 is that the straightforward lemmas
about safety of compound commands are usually already inductive, thereby ren-
dering the otherwise most challenging part of soundness proofs trivial. The only
exception is Lemma 5.3 about the resource declaration rule (for an extension of
Deﬁnition 3.1 to handle multiple named CCRs), which was arguably the most in-
tellectually challenging part of the proof.
A second beneﬁt is that we do not strictly require an abort semantics to prove the
soundness of CSL: if we drop condition (ii) from Deﬁnition 3.1, we can still prove
the soundness of CSL without ever referring to an abort semantics. In contrast,
proofs relying on the safety monotonicity and frame properties heavily depend on
an abort semantics (e.g., [3,4,5,6,9,10]).
4 Soundness Proof
We start with some basic –but important– properties of the semantics. In the
following, let [s ∼ s′]X stand for ∀x ∈ X. s(x) = s′(x) and X for the complement
of set X.
Proposition 4.1 If C, (s, h) → C ′, (s′, h′), then fv(C ′) ⊆ fv(C), wr(C ′) ⊆ wr(C),
and [s ∼ s′]wr(C).
Proposition 4.2 (i) If [s ∼ s′]fv(E), then [[E]](s) = [[E]](s′).
(ii) If [s ∼ s′]fv(B), then [[B]](s) = [[B]](s′).
(iii) If [s ∼ s′]fv(P ), then s, h |= P if and only if s′, h |= P .
(iv) If [s ∼ s′]fv(C) and C, s → abort, then C, s′ → abort.
(v) If X ⊇ fv(C) and [s ∼ s′]X and C, s → C1, s1, then there exist s′1 such that
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C, s′ → C ′1, s′1 and [s1 ∼ s′1]X .
Now, consider Deﬁnition 3.1. By construction, safe is monotonic with respect
to n: if a conﬁguration is safe for a number of steps, n, it is also safe for a smaller
number of steps, m. (This is proved by induction on m.)
Lemma 4.3 If safen(C, s, h, J,Q) and m ≤ n, then safem(C, s, h, J,Q).
Further, as a corollary of Proposition 4.2, safen(C, s, h, J,Q) depends only on
the values of variables that are mentioned in C, J , Q.
Lemma 4.4 If safen(C, s, h, J,Q) and [s ∼ s′]fv(C,J,Q), then safen(C, s′, h, J,Q).
The soundness theorem for CSL is the following:
Theorem 4.5 (CSL Soundness) If J  {P} C {Q}, then J |= {P} C {Q}.
Our proof strategy is to prove that each proof rule is a sound implication if we replace
all the  by |=. Then, the theorem follows by a straightforward rule induction. For
brevity, we only show the proofs of the most interesting rules.
(Skip) The rule for skip follows immediately from the following lemma, whose proof
is trivial because there are no transitions from skip.
Lemma 4.6 For all n, s, h, J , and Q, if s, h |= Q, then safen(skip, s, h, J,Q).
(Atom) We need an auxiliary lemma for code executing in atomic blocks:
Lemma 4.7 If ∀n. safen(C, s, h, emp, Q) and def(h unionmulti hF), then
(i) ¬(C, (s, h unionmulti hF) →∗ abort); and
(ii) if, moreover, C, (s, h unionmulti hF) →∗ skip, (s′, h′), then there exists h′′ such that
h′ = h′′ unionmulti hF and s′, h′′ |= Q.
This lemma is proved by an induction on the length of the →∗ traces, not-
ing that when J = emp, the second clause of Deﬁnition 3.1 simpliﬁes to
safen+1(C, s, h, emp, Q) if and only if
(i) if C = skip, then s, h |= Q; and
(ii) for all hF, if def(h unionmulti hF), then C, (s, h unionmulti hF) → abort; and
(iii) for all hF, C
′, s′, h′, if C, (s, h unionmulti hF) → C ′, (s′, h′), then there exists h′′ such
that h′ = h′′ unionmulti hF and safen(C ′, s′, h′′, J,Q).
The main lemma for atomic commands is as follows:
Lemma 4.8 If emp |= {P ∗ J} C {Q ∗ J}, then J |= {P} atomic C {Q}.
Proof. Assume (*) emp |= {P ∗ J} C {Q ∗ J}, and pick arbitrary s, h |= P and
n. We have to show that safen(atomic C, s, h, J,Q). If n = 0, this is trivial; so
consider n = m+ 1. Condition (i) is trivial as atomic C = skip.
(ii) If atomic C, (s, h unionmulti hJ unionmulti hF) → abort, then from the operational semantics
C, (s, h unionmulti hJ unionmulti hF) →∗ abort, which with Lemma 4.7 contradicts (*).
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(iii) The only way for atomic C, (s, h unionmulti hJ unionmulti hF) → C ′, (s′, h′) is if C ′ = skip and
C, (s, h unionmulti hJ unionmulti hF) →∗ skip, (s′, h′). Hence, from assumption (*) and Lemma 4.7,
there exists h′′ such that h′ = h′′ unionmulti hF and s′, h′′ |= Q ∗ J . So, there exist h′′′ and
h′J such that h
′′ = h′′′ unionmulti h′J , s′, h′′′ |= Q, and s′, h′J |= J . Finally, from Lemma 4.6,
we get safem(skip, s
′, h′′′, J,Q). 
(Par) For parallel composition, we need the following auxiliary lemma:
Lemma 4.9 If safen(C1, s, h1, J,Q1), safen(C2, s, h2, J,Q1), h1 unionmulti h2 is deﬁned,
fv(J,C1, Q1) ∩ wr(C2) = ∅, and fv(J,C2, Q2) ∩ wr(C1) = ∅, then
safen(C1‖C2, s, h1 unionmulti h2, J,Q1 ∗Q2).
Proof. By induction on n. In the inductive step, we know IH (n)
def
=
∀C1, h1, C2, h2. safen(C1, s, h1, J,Q1) ∧ safen(C2, s, h2, J,Q1) ∧ def(h1 unionmulti h2)
∧ fv(J,C1, Q1) ∩ wr(C2) = ∅ ∧ fv(J,C2, Q2) ∩ wr(C1) = ∅
=⇒ safen(C1‖C2, s, h1 unionmulti h2, J,Q1 ∗Q2)
and we have to show IH (n + 1). So, pick arbitrary C1, h1, C2, h2 and assume
(1) safen+1(C1, s, h1, J,Q1), (2) safen+1(C2, s, h2, J,Q2), (3) def(h1 unionmulti h2) and (4)
the variable side-conditions, and try to show safen+1(C1‖C2, s, h1 unionmulti h2, J,Q1 ∗Q2).
Condition (i) is trivial.
(ii) If C1‖C2, (s, h1 unionmulti h2 unionmulti hJ unionmulti hF) → abort, then according to the operational
semantics C1, (s, h1 unionmulti h2 unionmulti hJ unionmulti hF) → abort or C2, (s, h1 unionmulti h2 unionmulti hJ unionmulti hF) → abort,
contradicting our assumptions (1) and (2).
(iii) Pick arbitrary C ′, hJ , hF, s′, h′ such that s, hJ |= J , (h1 unionmulti h2 unionmulti hJ unionmulti hF) is
deﬁned, and C1‖C2, (s, h1 unionmulti h2 unionmulti hJ unionmulti hF) → (C ′, s′, h′). The operational semantics
has three possible transitions for C1‖C2.
Case (Par1). C ′ = C ′1‖C2 and C1, (s, h1 unionmulti h2 unionmulti hJ unionmulti hF) → C ′1, (s′, h′).
From (1), there exist h′1 and h′J such that h
′ = h′1 unionmulti h′J unionmulti (h2 unionmulti hF), s′, h′J |= J , and
safen(C
′
1, s
′, h′1, J,Q1).
From (2) and Proposition 4.3, we have safen(C2, s, h2, J,Q2). Then, from Propo-
sitions 4.4 and 4.1, and assumption (4), we have safen(C2, s
′, h2, J,Q2). Also, from
Proposition 4.1 and (4), fv(C ′1, Q1) ∩ wr(C2) = ∅ and fv(C2, Q2) ∩ wr(C ′1) = ∅, and
hence from IH (n), safen(C
′
1‖C2, s′, h′1 unionmulti h2, J,Q1 ∗Q2).
Case (Par2). This case is completely symmetric.
Case (Par3). C1 = C2 = C
′ = skip, h′ = h1 unionmulti h2 unionmulti hJ unionmulti hF. From (1) and
(2), unfolding the deﬁnition of safe, we have that s, h1 |= Q1 and s, h2 |= Q2. So,
s, h1 unionmulti h2 |= Q1 ∗Q2, and, from Lemma 4.6, safen(skip, s, h1 unionmulti h2). 
(Frame) The frame rule is a cut-down version of the parallel composition rule. It
follows directly from the following lemma:
Lemma 4.10 If safen(C, s, h, J,Q), fv(R) ∩ wr(C) = ∅, h unionmulti hR is deﬁned, and
s, hR |= R, then safen(C, s, h unionmulti hR, J,Q ∗R).
Proof. By induction on n. The base case is trivial. For the inductive step, assume
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(*) safen+1(C, s, h, J,Q), (†) fv(R) ∩ wr(C) = ∅, and (‡) s, hR |= R.
Now, we have to prove safen+1(C, s, h unionmulti hR, J,Q ∗R).
(i) From (*), we get s, h |= Q and so, using (‡), s, h unionmulti hR |= Q ∗R.
(ii) Pick hJ and hF. Then, from (*), C, (s, h unionmulti hR unionmulti hJ unionmulti hF) → abort.
(iii) If C, (s, h unionmulti hR unionmulti hJ unionmulti hF) → C ′, (s′, h′), then from (*), there exist h′′, h′J such
that h′ = h′′ unionmulti h′J unionmulti (hR unionmulti hF) and s′, h′J |= J and safen(C ′, s′, h′′, J,Q). Now, from
(†), (‡), Prop. 4.1 and 4.2, we get s′, hR |= R and fv(R) ∩ wr(C ′) = ∅. Therefore,
from the induction hypothesis, safen(C
′, s′, h′ unionmulti hR, J,Q ∗R). 
(Share) We need the following lemma, which is similar to the previous one.
Lemma 4.11 If safen(C, s, h, J ∗ R,Q), h unionmulti hR is deﬁned, and s, hR |= R, then
safen(C, s, h unionmulti hR, J,Q ∗R).
Proof. By induction on n. For the inductive step,
(i) From our assumptions, s, h |= Q and s, hR |= R, and so s, h unionmulti hR |= Q ∗R.
(ii) C, (s, h unionmulti hR unionmulti hJ unionmulti hF) → abort follows directly from our assumptions.
(iii) If C, (s, hunionmultihR unionmultihJ unionmultihF) → C ′, (s′, h′), then from our assumptions, there exist
h′′, h′JR such that h
′ = h′′unionmultih′JRunionmultihF and s′, h′JR |= J∗R and safen(C ′, s′, h′′, J∗R,Q).
From the deﬁnition of ∗, there exist h′J and h′R such that h′JR = h′Junionmultih′R and s′, h′J |=
J and s′, h′R |= R. Therefore, from the induction hypothesis, safen(C ′, s′, h′′ unionmulti
h′R, J,Q ∗R), as required. 
(Conj) Now consider the conjunction rule. Its soundness rests upon the validity of
the following implication:
safen(C, s, h, J,Q1) ∧ safen(C, s, h, J,Q2) =⇒ safen(C, s, h, J,Q1 ∧Q2) .
Naturally, one would expect to prove this implication by induction on n with an
induction hypothesis quantifying over all C and h. The base case is trivial; so
consider the n + 1 case. The ﬁrst two subcases are easy; so consider subcase (iii).
From the ﬁrst assumption, we know that there exist h1 and h1J such that h
′ = h1unionmultih1J
and h1J |= J and safen(C ′, h1, J,Q1). Similarly, from the ﬁrst assumption, there exist
h2 and h2J such that h
′ = h2unionmultih2J and h2J |= J and safen(C ′, h2, J,Q2), but, in general,
we do not know that h1 = h2 which would allow us to complete the proof. Since,
however, J must be precise, then (from Deﬁnition 2.1) h1J = h
2
J , and since unionmulti is
cancellative, we also have h1 = h2 and the result follows by applying the induction
hypothesis. 
5 Multiple Resources & Data Race Freedom
In this section, we consider the programming language used by O’Hearn [15] and
Brookes [3], which has multiple named resources and permits the execution of critical
regions acting on diﬀerent resources to go on in parallel. The programming language
replaces atomic commands, atomic C, with two new constructs and an intermediate
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(C1, σ) → (C′1, σ′)
locked(C′1) ∩ locked(C2) = ∅
(C1‖C2, σ) → (C′1‖C2, σ′)
(Par1)
(C2, σ) → (C′2, σ′)
locked(C1) ∩ locked(C′2) = ∅
(C1‖C2, σ) → (C1‖C′2, σ′)
(Par2)
(accesses(C1, s) ∩ writes(C2, s)) ∪ (accesses(C2, s) ∩ writes(C1, s)) = ∅
(C1‖C2, (s, h)) → abort
(RaceDetect)
(Res1) resource r in C, σ → resource r in C′, σ′ if C, σ → C′, σ′
(Res2) resource r in skip, σ → skip, σ
(With1) with r when B do C, σ → within r do C, σ if σ = (s, h) and [[B]](s)
(With2) within r do C, σ → within r do C′, σ′ if C, σ → C′, σ′
(With3) within r do skip, σ → skip, σ
(ResA) resource r in C, σ → abort if C, σ → abort
(WithA) within r do C, σ → abort if C, σ → abort
Fig. 3. Operational semantics for CCRs.
command form:
C ::= . . . | resource r in C | with r when B do C | within r do C
The ﬁrst declares a new mutual exclusion lock, r, known as a resource or a resource
bundle in CSL terminology. The second construct denotes a conditional critical
region (CCR) which runs in isolation with respect to any other CCRs with the same
lock. Executing a CCR blocks until the resource is available and the condition B is
true, and then executes the body C in isolation to other CCRs acting on the same
resource. This is achieved by holding a lock for the duration of testing whether
B is satisﬁed and the execution of its body. Finally, within r do C represents a
partially executed CCR: one that has acquired the lock, tested the condition, and
still has to execute C. We deﬁne locked(C) to be the set of regions syntactically
locked by C: those r for which C contains a within r do C ′ subterm.
The operational semantics is given by the rules of Figure 1 (excluding Par1,
Par2, Atom, AtomA) and the new rules shown in Figure 3. The reduction rules
for parallel composition (Par1, Par2) have been adapted to check that two threads
do not hold the same lock at the same time. This was unnecessary in the simpler
setting because atomic blocks executed in one step.
To show absence of data races, we have added a rule (RaceDetect) that aborts
whenever a data race is observed. Here, the functions accesses(C, s) and writes(C, s)
return the set of heap locations accessed or modiﬁed by C respectively. Their formal
deﬁnitions can be found in [18].
CSL judgments for multiple resources are of the form Γ  {P} C {Q}, where
Γ is a mapping from resource names, r, to their corresponding resource invariants,
which are normal assertions. We have the proof rules from Figure 2 –except (Atom)
and (Share)– uniformly replacing J by Γ. In addition, we have the following two
rules concerning resource declarations and CCRs:
Γ, r : J  {P} C {Q}
Γ  {P ∗ J} resource r in C {Q ∗ J}
Γ  {(P ∗ J) ∧B} C {Q ∗ J}
Γ, r : J  {P} with r when B do C {Q}
The ﬁrst rule is analogous to the Share rule: it allows us to declare a new
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resource bundle, r, and associate a resource invariant with it. The second rule
is analogous to Atom, allowing the veriﬁer to assume that the relevant resource
invariant holds separately at the beginning of the CCR and requiring him to be
re-establish it at the end of the CCR.
The deﬁnition of conﬁguration safety is adapted as follows:
Deﬁnition 5.1
• safe0(C, s, h,Γ, Q) holds always.
• safen+1(C, s, h,Γ, Q) if and only if
(i) if C = skip, then s, h |= Q; and
(ii) for all hF, if (h unionmulti hF) is deﬁned, then C, (s, h unionmulti hF) → abort; and
(iii) accesses(C, s) ⊆ dom(h); and
(iv) for all C ′, hΓ, hF, s′, h′, L′, if s, hΓ |=r∈locked(C′)\locked(C) Γ(r), and (C, (s, hunionmulti
hΓ unionmulti hF), L) → (C ′, (s′, h′), L′), then there exist h′′ and h′Γ such that h′ =
h′′ unionmulti h′Γ unionmulti hF and s′, h′Γ |=r∈locked(C)\locked(C′) Γ(r) and safen(C ′, s′, h′′,Γ, Q).
Similar to Deﬁnition 3.1, here h is the part of the heap owned by the command;
hΓ is the part that belongs to deﬁnitely unacquired resources (since any memory
cells belonging to a currently acquired resource are part of the local heap of the
thread that holds the lock for that resource); and hF represents the frame, namely
memory cells belonging to other parts of the system. The set locked(C ′)\ locked(C)
represents the set of locks that have been acquired by the transition from C to C ′:
for all of those, we assume that the resource invariant holds. Conversely, locked(C ′)\
locked(C) is the set of locks released by the transition: for all those, we check that the
resource invariant is established. Finally, the new conjunct accesses(C, s) ⊆ dom(h)
is included so that we can show that safe programs do not have any data races.
As before, the semantics of triples is given in terms of the safe predicate:
Deﬁnition 5.2 Γ |= {P} C {Q} if and only if for all n, s, h, if s, h |= P then
safen(C,L, s, h,Γ, Q).
The proof of soundness proceeds as before and has been fully formalised in
Isabelle/HOL. See [18] for details. We say that a command is well-formed if and
only if it does not have two diﬀerent subcommands simultaneously having acquired
the same CCR lock, as this cannot occur in a normal execution. To prove the
soundness of the two new rules, we use the following lemmas:
Lemma 5.3 If safen(C, s, h, (Γ, r : R), Q) and C is well-formed and fv(R)∩wr(C) =
∅, then
(i) if r /∈ locked(C), then for all hR, if dom(h) ∩ dom(hR) = ∅ and s, hR |= R,
then safen(resource r in C, s, h unionmulti hR,Γ, Q ∗R); and
(ii) if r ∈ locked(C), then safen(resource r in C, s, h,Γ, Q ∗R).
Lemma 5.4 If safen(C, s, h,Γ, Q ∗ R) and within r do C is well-formed, then
safen(within r do C, s, h, (Γ, r : R), Q).
V. Vafeiadis / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 276 (2011) 335–351346
The proofs of these lemmas can be found in [18]. Our formalisation also covers
local variable declarations as well as the auxiliary variable elimination rule as in
Brookes’s original proof [3].
6 Permissions
Permissions [2,1] are an extension to the standard heap model that enables
read-sharing between parallel threads. Consider, for example, the Hoare triple:
{10 → −} x := [10] ‖ y := [10] {10 → −}. Standard CSL cannot verify that the
program satisﬁes its speciﬁcation because to read from [10] both threads must
know that the cell is allocated (i.e., have 10 → − as a precondition), but the
assertion 10 → − ∗ 10 → − (required by the parallel composition rule) is unsatis-
ﬁable. With permissions, one can instead split 10 → − into two half permissions,
(10
0.5→ −) ∗ (10 0.5→ −), and give one to each thread. The idea then is such partial
permissions are read-only: they allow the cell to be read, but not updated. This is
captured by the following new proof rule:
x /∈ fv(E,E′, E′′, J)
J  {E E′→ E′′} x := [E] {E E′→ E′′ ∧ x = E′′}
(Read2)
At the postcondition, the two half permissions are collected and joined to give back
10 → −, which is just shorthand notation for 10 1→ −.
Permission models are sets, K, with a distinguished element,  ∈ K, called
full permission, and a commutative and associative partial operator, ⊕, denoting
addition of two permissions, satisfying the following properties:
∀k ∈ K. ¬def(⊕ k) and ∀k ∈ K \ {}. ∃k′ ∈ K. k ⊕ k′ = 
The ﬁrst equation says that  is the greatest permission, as it cannot be combined
with any other permission. The second equation says that every non-full permission
has a complement permission which when added to it gives full permission. The
model we saw previously is known as fractional permissions. K is the set of numbers
in the range (0, 1], ⊕ is ordinary addition and is undeﬁned when the result falls out
of the range, and  = 1. The complement of fractional permission k is simply 1−k.
To model a heap with permissions, we extend ⊕ to act on permission-value pairs
as follows:
(k1, v1)⊕ (k2, v2) def=
{
(k1 ⊕ k2, v1) if v1 = v2 and def(k1 ⊕ k2)
undeﬁned otherwise
We also extend ⊕ to act on permission-heaps, PH def= Loc ⇀ (Perm × Val), as
follows. We take h1 ⊕ h2 to be deﬁned if and only if h1(a)⊕ h2(a) is deﬁned for all
a ∈ (dom(h1)∩dom(h2)). If h1⊕h2 is deﬁned, it has domain dom(h1)∪dom(h2)
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with the following values:
(h1 ⊕ h2)(a) def=
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
h1(a)⊕ h2(a) if a ∈ (dom(h1) ∩ dom(h2))
h1(a) if a ∈ (dom(h1) \ dom(h2))
h2(a) if a ∈ (dom(h2) \ dom(h1))
As expected, adding two permission-heaps is deﬁned whenever for each location in
their overlap, the heaps store the same value and permissions that can be added
together. The result is a permission-heap whose permissions for the location in the
overlap is just the sum of the individual heaps.
Assertions are now modelled by permission-heaps, PH. The new assertion form
E1
E2→ E3 has the following semantics:
s, h |= E1 E2→ E3 def⇐⇒ dom(h) = {[[E1]](s)} ∧ h([[E1]](s)) = ([[E2]](s), [[E3]](s))
We can consider the set of concrete heaps as being a subset of that of permission-
heaps by equating a concrete heap, h, with the permission-heap, h′, which has the
same domain as h and for each location  ∈ dom(h), h′() = (, h()). In other
words, h′ has full permission and the same values for every location in h, and
no permission for any other location. Observe that every permission-heap can be
extended to a normal heap:
∀h ∈ PH. ∃hF ∈ PH. (h⊕ hF) ∈ Heap .
This allows us to use the same deﬁnitions for safe predicate as we have seen already,
uniformly replacing unionmulti with ⊕ and having the h, hF, etc. range over permission-
heaps rather than normal heaps. The deﬁnition is a bit subtle: as the operational
semantics is deﬁned over normal heaps, (C, h ⊕ hJ ⊕ hF) → . . . makes sense only
when h ⊕ hJ ⊕ hF is a normal heap, a condition that is always possible to achieve
as hF is universally quantiﬁed.
The check in the safe deﬁnition that hF does not change by transitions ensures
that programs update the values only of heap locations they have full permission
to, but allows threads to access any memory they partially own.
The soundness proof carries over to permission-heaps with no diﬃculty. See the
machine-checked proof [18] for details.
7 RGSep
RGSep [19] is a more radical extension to CSL replacing resource invariants by two
binary predicates, R and G, known as the rely and the guarantee respectively. As
in CSL, the heap is logically divided into parts owned by threads and other parts
owned by resources (and hence shared among threads, but accessed only within an
atomic commands). The rely, R, describes the changes made to the resource-owned
states by the environment (i.e., every other thread in the system that could execute
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concurrently with the current command), whereas the guarantee, G, describes the
changes made by the command itself.
Preconditions and postconditions are also changed into binary predicates de-
scribing both the local (thread-owned) and the shared (resource-owned) components
of the state. We shall use the notation s, (h1, h2) |= P to denote that the stack s
and the heaps h1 and h2 satisfy the binary assertion P , whether it is a pre-, a post-,
a rely or a guarantee condition. 4
The safeRG predicate records not only the local heap, hL, but also the shared
heap, hS , as this is needed for R and G:
Deﬁnition 7.1
• safeRG0 (C, s, hL, hS , R,G,Q) holds always.
• safeRGn+1(C, s, hL, hS , R,G,Q) if and only if
(i) if C = skip, then s, (hL, hS) |= Q; and
(ii) for all hF, C, (s, hL unionmulti hS unionmulti hF) → abort; and
(iii) whenever C, (s, hL unionmulti hS unionmulti hF) → C ′, (s′, h′), then there exist h′L and h′S such
that h′ = h′L unionmulti h′S unionmulti hF and s, (hS , h′S) |= G and safeRGn (C ′, s′, h′L, h′S , R,G,Q);
(iv) whenever s, (hS , h
′
S)|=R and def(hL unionmulti h′S), then safeRGn (C, s, hL, h′S , R,G,Q).
A conﬁguration is safe for n + 1 steps if (i) whenever it is a terminal conﬁgu-
ration, it satisﬁes the postcondition; and (ii) it does not abort; and (iii) whenever
it performs a transition, its change to the shared state satisﬁes the guarantee and
the new conﬁguration remains safe for n steps; and ﬁnally (iv) whenever the envi-
ronment changes the shared state according to the rely, the resulting conﬁguration
remains safe for another n steps.
The semantics of RGSep judgments is deﬁned in terms of safeRG in the standard
way:
Deﬁnition 7.2 R;G |=RGSep {P} C {Q} if and only if for all s, hL, hS , and n, if
s, (hL, hS) |= P , then safeRGn (C, s, hL, hS , R,G,Q).
Note that the RGSep deﬁnitions use exactly the same operational semantics for
commands as the CSL deﬁnitions: we did not have to come up with a new special
semantics. As we did earlier with CSL, it is possible to extend the RGSep deﬁnitions
to multiple shared regions. The soundness proof goes through in pretty much the
same way as in §4 and in [17].
8 Conclusion
The paper has presented a concise soundness proof of CSL and related program
logics that does not involve any intermediate instrumented semantics, unlike most
proofs in the literature (e.g., [3,5,9,13,6]). We have shown that inventing elabo-
rate semantics is unnecessary and have argued that it is also harmful because it
4 RGSep uses diﬀerent syntax to denote pre- and postconditions than the one used to denote rely and
guarantee conditions. In this paper, however, we shall not go into the syntax of RGSep assertions, and so
we overlook such syntactic diﬀerences.
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obscures the soundness argument. This becomes increasingly problematic as one
moves towards larger languages and more complicated concurrent program logics.
As mentioned already, there exist several soundness proofs for concurrent sep-
aration logic, while even the ﬁrst proof by Brookes [3] came 3-4 years after the
CSL proof rules were conceived. This is partly due to the intricacy of the sound-
ness resulting from imprecise assertions (cf., Reynolds’s counterexample [15, §11])
and partly due to the numerous extensions to CSL that came along (e.g., permis-
sions [2,1], “variables as resource” [16], “locks-in-the-heap” [9,13]) for which existing
proofs required adaptation (e.g. [5]) or new proofs were developed [9,11,13].
A partial solution to the plethora of adapted proofs was given by Calcagno
et al. [6] with abstract separation logic, a soundness proof of CSL with respect
to an abstract operational semantics to commands that could be instantiated to
the various permission and variables-as-resource models. This unifying approach,
unfortunately, has a signiﬁcant drawback: the soundness of any particular instance
of the logic (e.g., CSL with fractional permissions) tells us nothing about how
veriﬁed programs behave when executed by the hardware. This is because the
instantiated abstract semantics bears little resemblance to the ‘machine semantics.’
To get a meaningful correspondence, one would have to relate the two semantics,
a task that is most likely non-trivial. This is why our proof is instead based on a
concrete semantics.
The style of semantic deﬁnitions presented in this paper has also been used
to justify the soundness of more advanced program logics, such as the concurrent
abstract predicates of Dinsdale-Young et al. [7]. So far, however, we have used this
style of semantic deﬁnitions to justify the correctness only of program logics about
partial correctness. It is quite possible to extend these deﬁnitions in order to capture
certain kinds of liveness properties. For example, we can deﬁne the meaning of a
Hoare triple for obstruction-freedom by changing safe0(C, h, ...) instead of always
being true to require that C terminates under no environment interference. In the
future, I would like to explore this direction further.
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